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When a Measure Becomes a Target

In 1975 the British economist Charles Goodhart observed that statistical regularities tend to collapse once they are used for the purpose of control. The idea has since been popularised in a sharper form, usually called Goodhart's law: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. It is one of those principles that sound almost too neat to be true, until one starts noticing it everywhere.

Consider a hospital that is judged on how quickly patients are seen after arriving in the emergency department. The intention is admirable; nobody wants the sick to wait. Yet once the waiting time becomes the figure on which managers are assessed, the incentive shifts subtly from treating patients promptly to recording that they were treated promptly. Patients may be "seen" briefly to stop the clock, then left waiting elsewhere. The number improves, while the experience it was meant to describe may not.

Schools offer an equally familiar example. Examination results are a reasonable indicator of what pupils have learned, provided nobody is trying too hard to raise them. Once a school's reputation, funding or a teacher's career depends on them, it becomes rational to teach precisely what the examination rewards and little else. Scores rise; whether understanding rises with them is another matter.

What makes the law so persistent is that nobody in these stories need be dishonest. Each individual responds sensibly to the incentives in front of them, and the distortion emerges from the system as a whole. That is also why simply adding more measures rarely solves the problem: every new indicator becomes a fresh target, with its own opportunities for gaming.

The more promising responses are less mechanical. Some organisations rotate the indicators they pay attention to, so that none can be optimised for long; others combine numbers with the judgement of people close enough to the work to see what the figures conceal. Neither approach is as tidy as a single, objective score. But tidiness, Goodhart's law suggests, may be precisely what we should be most suspicious of.

שאלות הבנה

  1. 1. What does Goodhart's law state, as described in the text?

    1. When a measure becomes a target, it stops being a good measure
    2. Economists should not set targets
    3. Every organisation needs more measures
    4. Statistics are always unreliable
  2. 2. In the hospital example, what may happen once waiting time becomes a target?

    1. Hospitals hire more doctors
    2. Patients are seen briefly to stop the clock and then wait elsewhere
    3. Waiting times are no longer recorded
    4. Patients choose other hospitals
  3. 3. According to the writer, why does the problem persist even without dishonesty?

    1. The measures are calculated incorrectly
    2. People ignore the rules
    3. Individuals respond sensibly to incentives and the distortion comes from the system
    4. Managers deliberately hide the truth
  4. 4. Why does adding more measures rarely help?

    1. Nobody reads them
    2. They contradict each other
    3. They are too expensive
    4. Each new measure becomes another target that can be gamed
  5. 5. What is the writer's attitude to a single, objective score?

    1. It should be viewed with suspicion
    2. It is only useful in hospitals
    3. It is impossible to calculate
    4. It is the best solution available

שאלות פתוחות

  • Think of a target in your school, workplace or daily life. Has it ever been reached in a way that missed its real purpose?
  • Is it possible to measure success without creating the problem the text describes? Discuss.

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